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Resilience of Electricity Distribution Networks
Part II: Leveraging Microgrids
Devendra Shelar, Saurabh Amin, and Ian Hiskens
Abstract—Advances in microgrids powered by Dis-
tributed Energy Resources (DERs) make them an at-
tractive response capability for improving the resilience
of electricity distribution networks (DNs). This paper
presents an approach to evaluate the value of imple-
menting a timely response using microgrid operations
and DER dispatch in the aftermath of a disruption
event, involving strategic compromise of multiple DN
components. Firstly, we extend the resiliency assess-
ment framework in [1] and develop a sequential (bilevel)
model of attacker-operator interactions on a radial DN
with one or more microgrids. Particularly, the operator
response includes microgrid operations under various
islanding configurations (regimes), and single- or multi-
master operation of DERs in providing grid-forming
services as well as frequency and voltage regulation.
Secondly, we introduce a restoration problem in which
the operator gradually reconnects the disrupted com-
ponents over multiple periods to restore the nominal
performance of the DN. The first problem, formulated
as a bilevel mixed-integer problem, is solved using a
Benders decomposition method. The second problem,
formulated as a multi-period mixed-integer problem,
can be solved using a greedy algorithm. Our results
illustrate the benefit of using microgrids in reducing the
operator’s losses, both immediately after the disruption
event and during the restoration process.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical systems, network se-
curity, smart grids, bilevel optimization, microgrids
I. Introduction
Modern electricity Distribution Networks (DNs) are
prone to risks of service interruptions due to the failures of
unreliable, and often insecure, cyber and physical compo-
nents. Recent disruptions caused by natural disasters [2]
and security attacks [3, 4] highlight the vulnerability of
DNs to cyberphysical failures. In this article, we investi-
gate the use of microgrid technologies such as microgrid
islanding and dispatch of Distributed Energy Resources
(DERs) [4, 5, 6] toward improving DN resilience. His-
torically, the idea of DER-powered microgrids as a re-
sponse mechanism has been considered for responding to
reliability failures [4, 6, 7]. Indeed, microgrids have been
implemented to support the reliability targets of critical
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facilities such as hospitals, industrial plants, and military
bases. However, their technological feasibility (and related
operational aspects) in responding to security failures
has received limited attention. We address this issue by
building on our work in [1], and focus on evaluating the
effectiveness of DER-powered microgrids in limiting post-
contingency losses after a disruption.
We model the sequential interaction between a DN
operator and an external adversary as follows [1]:
LMm :“ max
dPDk
min
uPU pdq
L pu, xq s.t. x P X puq , (P1)
where d P Dk denotes an attacker strategy, u P U pdq
an operator response strategy, x P X the network state,
and L the composite loss function, the details of which
are presented in Sec. IV. In [1], we argued that cy-
berphysical disruptions to DNs can lead to operating
bound violations and cause uncontrolled or forced dis-
connects of DN components. Specifically, we modeled the
impact of attacker-induced disconnects of DN components
as supply-demand disturbances, and the impact of TN-
side disturbances as voltage deviations at the substation
node. Then, we considered preemptive load control and
component disconnects as operator response actions for
the generic setting when the attacker’s (resp. operator’s)
goal is to maximize (resp. minimize) the post-contingency
losses. We introduced RMm :“ 100 p1´ LMm{Lmaxq as
a resilience metric of the DN, where Lmax (chosen for
sake of normalization) denotes the operator loss when
all DN components are disconnected; see Fig. 1. Finally,
we evaluated the value of optimal response as the total
reduction in post-contingency losses relative to the case of
autonomous (local protection driven) disconnections, i.e.
RMm ´RAD, where RAD “ 100 p1´ LAD{Lmaxq.
In this article, we consider another bilevel formulation:
LMG :“ max
dPDmk
min
uPUmpdq
Lm pu, xq s.t. x P Xm puq , (P2)
where the network model Xm, and the loss function Lm
are extended to capture microgrid operations (Sec. II) and
DER dispatch and regulation aspects (Sec. III); the set of
attacker strategies Dmk and the set of operator strategies
Um are also modified to capture attacker-operator inter-
actions for DNs with DER-powered microgrids (Sec. IV).
The maximin value of (P2), LMG, denotes the worst-
case post-contingency loss incurred by the operator for
the given microgrid and DER capabilities; see Fig. 1.
Then, RMG :“ 100 p1´ LMG{Lmaxq can be viewed as a
resilience metric of the DN under microgrid-enabled op-
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erator response. Furthermore, the relative value of timely
microgrid response (or equivalently, the improvement in
DN resilience due to microgrids) can be evaluated as
pRMG´RMmq. We posit that advances in DER-enabled mi-
crogrids and emergency control operations at the substa-
tion level can be leveraged to implement timely resiliency-
improving response actions (less than a few seconds after
a disturbance event).
t
Disturbance
Detect
Response (b)
Response (c)
Response (d)
DN restoration
Secondary
control
0
RAD
RMm
RMG
100
Sy
st
em
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
L M
m
L A
D
L m
ax
restoration
begins
LMG
Fig. 1: Performance under various response capabilities.
In [1], we considered three operator response models:
(a) Remote control by the control center during normal
conditions;
(b) Autonomous (protection driven) disconnection of in-
dividual components (tripping of DGs or loads under
nodal violations in operating conditions); and
(c) Emergency control by a secure Substation Automa-
tion (SA) system.
As in [1], it is assumed that the emergency control actions
(c) subsume the autonomous actions (b) by making deci-
sions that are coordinated across the SA system. Hence,
(b) and (c) are never simultaneously active. Furthermore,
in this paper, we consider the following extension of (c):
(d) Emergency control by the SA involving microgrid
islanding and DER dispatch.
Analogous to [1], we consider that the SA system can
detect the disrupted components from changes in mea-
surements of net nodal consumption. By using knowledge
of the attack the SA can compute and implement the
operator response in a timely manner. For our purposes,
response (d) is an optimal second-stage response in (P2).
Our analysis relies on the premise that such response can
be implemented via modern SA systems during disrup-
tions. Indeed, the continued improvements in SA system
disturbance detection and control capabilities can further
assist in restoration operations.
The resiliency of a system also reflects how quickly it
can rebound to its nominal state after a disruption [1, 8].
Microgrids can provide partial demand satisfaction during
the system restoration process, especially during the time
when the DN is fully disconnected from the TN. We
consider an admittedly simple, but practically relevant,
multi-period DN restoration problem in which the dis-
rupted DN components are gradually restored over several
periods; refer to “DN restoration” in Fig. 1. Our goal in
this problem is to compute an operator strategy in each
time period (roughly, on the order of a few minutes). Such
a strategy is comprised of reconnecting disrupted com-
ponents, modifying the microgrid islanding configuration,
and dispatching the DERs within individual microgrids.
Our modeling approach addresses some key issues re-
garding microgrid and DER operations. In particular, we
allow for the formation of one or more microgrid islands
in radial DNs. When all the microgrids are connected to
the transmission network (TN), the DN is operating in
the grid-connected regime. If none of the microgrids are
connected to the TN, then the DN is operating in the
fully-islanded regime. In our approach, the DN can also
operate in a partially-islanded regime, in which some of the
microgrids are connected to the TN while other microgrids
are not. In both partially- and fully- islanded regimes, each
microgrid can operate as an isolated microgrid or as part
of a larger microgrid. To model power flows in each of
the microgrids, we introduce a natural extension of the
LinDistFlow equations. The resulting network model cap-
tures DN operations in all the above-mentioned regimes
(Sec. II). We limit attention to linear power flows mainly
for the ease of exposition.
Importantly, we consider the parallel operation of multi-
ple DERs for the provision of grid-forming services, which
involve providing voltage and frequency references, as well
as maintaining voltage and frequency within operating
bounds (i.e. regulation services). When a microgrid is
connected to the TN, the bulk generators provide the
grid-forming services. However, when a microgrid is dis-
connected from the TN, then at least one DER within
that microgrid must provide the grid-forming services [5].
Depending on the number of grid-forming DERs within a
microgrid, one can consider two modes of DER operation
under islanded regimes, namely Single-Master Operation
(with a single grid-forming DER) and Multi-Master Op-
eration (with more than one grid-forming DER) [5]. Our
model is sufficiently flexible to capture both the single-
and multi-master modes of DER operation. In addition to
voltage regulation, we also consider frequency regulation,
which becomes important for microgrids due to the low
inertia of the DERs. By using the appropriate droop
control equations, we capture both frequency and voltage
regulation aspects resulting from multiple DERs operating
in parallel within a microgrid (Sec. III).
Our main contributions are as follows:
p‹q We capture the different microgrid regimes as well
as DER operating modes by developing a new mixed-
integer linear network model. This modeling approach
enables us to formulate (P2) as a Bilevel Mixed-
Integer Problem (BiMIP). In [1], we showed that (P1)
is also a BiMIP, and can be solved using a Benders
Decomposition (BD) algorithm. In Sec. IV, we show
that this algorithm can be applied to the extended
formulation (P2).
p‹q Our network model is also well-suited for formulating
a DN restoration problem as a multi-period Mixed-
Integer Problem (MIP). In our restoration problem,
the network state in any period only depends on the
operator response actions in that period, and the
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network state in the previous period. We exploit this
feature and propose a greedy heuristic that seeks to
reconnect the disrupted components in each period
such that the post-contingency losses for that period
are minimized (Sec. VI).
II. Multi-Microgrid DN model
In this section, we develop a model of a radial DN with
one or more microgrids. This network model extends the
LinDistFlow model [9] to multi-microgrid settings.
We distinguish between two operating stages o and
c, which denote the pre- and post- contingency stage,
respectively. The network is initially in o stage, and after
the disturbance event enters the c stage; see Sec. IV for
details on the disturbance model. Let η P to, cu denote
the operating stage of the network. We define the network
state as xη :“ ppη, qη, P η, Qη, vη, fηqJ, where each of these
entries are themselves vectors of appropriate dimensions,
and are described in Table I.
In our DN model, we consider a radial network consist-
ing of one or more microgrids. We refer to a distribution
line pi, jq P M Ď E as a microgrid connecting line if it
connects a microgrid to the TN or to other microgrids;
see Fig. 2. Here M denotes a given fixed set of connecting
lines. For a connecting line pi, jq P M, we use klηij “ 0
(resp. klηij “ 1) to indicate that it is in the closed
(resp. open) state. The DN operating regimes are defined
according to the states of the connecting lines:
- Grid-connected regime when all connecting lines are
closed (i.e klηij “ 0 @ pi, jq PM),
- Fully-islanded regime when all connecting lines are
open (i.e. klηij “ 1 @ pi, jq PM), or
- Partially-islanded regime when there exists at least
two connecting lines such that one of them is closed
and the other is open (i.e. D pi, jq, pm,nq P M such
that klηij “ 0 and klηmn “ 1).
Let tN1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,N|M|u denote the set of disjoint microgrid
subnetworks of the DN, where each Ni for i P t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , |M|u
denotes a connected subnetwork when all connecting lines
are open, i.e. klηmn “ 1 for all pm,nq P M. For each
subnetwork Ni, let Mi ĎM denote the set of connecting
lines which need to be open for Ni to be completely
isolated (i.e. autonomously operating). A microgrid island
is formed when an individual microgrid or a connected
subnetwork of more than one microgrid no longer receives
power supply from the TN. Also, let Pi denote the set of
lines along the path connecting node i to the substation
node. For example, in Fig. 2 the set of connecting lines for
the subnetwork N1 “ t1, 2u is M1 “ tp0, 1q, p2, 3q, p2, 5qu.
For this example, P5 “ tp0, 1q, p1, 2q, p2, 5qu. Also, if
klη01 “ 1, klη23 “ 0, and klη25 “ 1, then the microgrid
N3 is operating as an isolated island, whereas microgrids
N1 and N2 are operating together as part of one larger
microgrid island.
Remark 1. The smaller microgrids are typically used
for supplying power to a critical facility (e.g. hospital,
university, prison). In our model, these microgrids can be
DN parameters
N set of nodes in DN
E set of edges in DN
0 substation node label
M Ď E set of microgrid connecting lines
Ni Ď N nodes belonging to ith microgrid
Mi ĎM set of lines which if open isolate the ith microgrid
j complex square root of -1, j “ ?´1
vnom nominal squared voltage magnitude (1 pu)
fnom nominal system frequency (1 pu)
Pi Ď E lines on the path between node i and substation node
DER categories
S set of DERs
Sgf Ď S set of grid-forming DERs
S Ď Sgf set of PQ Inverter (PQI)-controlled DERs
Sfixedpq Ď Spq set of PQI-controlled DERs with fixed setpoints
Svarpq Ă Spq set of PQI-controlled DERs with controllable setpoints
Sutilitygf Ď Sgf set of utility-owned grid-forming DERs
S facilitygf Ď Sgf set of facility level microgrid-specific grid-forming DERs
Sgi “ Sgf ŤSvarpq set of grid-interactive DERs
Nodal quantities of node i P N
vi squared voltage magnitude at node i
fi system frequency measured at node i
vci,vci lower, upper voltage bounds for load i
vg
i
,vgi lower, upper voltage bounds for DG i
fci, fci lower, upper frequency bounds for load i
fg
i
, fgi lower, upper frequency bounds for DG i
pci ` jqci nominal demand at node i
pci ` jqci actual power consumed at node i
kci P t0, 1u 0 if load i is connected to DN; 1 otherwise
βi fraction of demand satisfied at node i
β
i
lower bound of load control parameter βi
pgi ` jqgi nominal generation of DG i P Sfixedpq
pgi ` jqgi actual power generated by DG i P Sfixedpq
kgi P t0, 1u 0 if DG i P Sfixedpq is connected to DN; 1 otherwise
Quantities of DER s P S
jpsq the DN node where the DER s P Sgf is located
JpSq Ď N the set of DN nodes where the DERs in the set S Ď S are
located
pn
s
,pns lower, upper active power bounds of microsource s P Sgf
qn
s
,qns lower, upper reactive power bounds of microsource s P Sgf
pns ` jqns total power supplied by microsource s P Sgf
pe
s
,pes lower, upper active power bounds of storage s P Sgf
qe
s
,qes lower, upper reactive power bounds of storage s P Sgf
pes ` jqes total power supplied by storage s P Sgf
krs P t0, 1u 1 if DER s P Sgf contributes to grid-forming services
prs ` jqrs total power supplied by DER s P Sgf
prrefs ,qrrefs active, reactive power references of DER s P Sgf
f refs ,vrefs frequence, voltage references of DER s P Sgf
Parameters of edge pi, jq P E
klij P t0, 1u 1 if pi, jq is switched open; 0 otherwise
Pij ` jQij power flowing from node i to node j
rij ,xij resistance and reactance of line pi, jq P E
TABLE I: Table of Notation.
0 1 2
3 4
5 6
N1 “ t1, 2u
N2 “ t3, 4u
N3 “ t5, 6u
M1 “ tp0, 1q, p2, 3q, p2, 5qu
M2 “ tp2, 3qu
P5 “ tp0, 1q, p1, 2q, p2, 5qu
Substation
node
Connecting
Line
Fig. 2: Multi-microgrid DN model.
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leveraged to supply power to the DN during emergency
conditions (fully- or partially-islanded regimes).
Now, we describe the constraints related to the power
flows, nodal frequencies and load connectivity in micro-
grids. Unless explicitly stated, the following constraints
are valid for either operating stage η P to, cu.
1) Power flows: A connecting line permits power flow
through it if and only if it is closed. We model this
constraint as follows:∣∣P ηij∣∣ ď `1´ klηij˘M @ pi, jq PM (1a)∣∣Qηij∣∣ ď `1´ klηij˘M @ pi, jq PM, (1b)
where M is a large constant. This typical modeling trick to
use a constraint of the type |a´ c| ď yM where y P t0, 1u,
enforces an equality a “ c only when y “ 0; otherwise
the equality is not binding. We use this trick repeatedly
to model various other constraints of a similar type.
2) Voltage drop: The voltage drop along a non-
connecting line pi, jq RM is given by the standard voltage
drop equation of the LinDistFlow model [9]:
vηj “ vηi ´ 2rijP ηij ´ 2xijQηij @ pi, jq P EzM. (2)
However, for a connecting line, the voltage drop constraint
is active only if it is closed, and is inactive, otherwise, i.e.∣∣vηj ´ `vηi ´ 2rijP ηij ´ 2xijQηij˘∣∣ ď klηijM @ pi, jq PM. (3)
3) Nodal frequencies: In islanded regimes, the DER(s)
must provide grid-forming and regulation services [5, 10].
Moreover, a microgrid island can have multiple DERs
operating in parallel. We assume that DERs can rapidly
synchronize their frequencies to a common value with the
help of power electronics [5]. This value can be regarded as
the island’s frequency. To model that the nodal frequencies
within a microgrid island are identical in steady state, we
can write:
fηi “ fηj @ i, j P Nk and @ k “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , |M| ,
which is equivalent to writing:
fηi “ fηj @ pi, jq P EzM, (4)
because if a line pi, jq is not a connecting line, i.e.
pi, jq P EzM, then nodes i and j both belong to the same
microgrid. Generically, frequency of every microgrid island
can be different from the frequency of the TN-connected
substation node. Moreover, the frequencies of any two
microgrid islands that are not connected to each other can
also be different. We model this constraint as follows:∣∣fηi ´ fηj ∣∣ ď klηijM @ pi, jq PM. (5)
Finally, we model the constraint that the load gets discon-
nected (i.e. kcηi “ 1) when the nodal frequency violates the
safe operating bounds:
kcηi ě fci ´ fηi , kcηi ě fηi ´ fci @ i P N. (6)
III. Distributed Energy Resources (DERs)
We now introduce a generic taxonomy of DERs that is
relevant to microgrid operations (see [11]) and a model
which captures both single- and multi-master operating
modes of DERs. Refer to Fig. 3 for DER categories and
Table II for a comparison of their capabilities.
Set of DERs (S)
PQI-controlled (Spq)Grid-forming (Sgf)
(Sutilitygf ) (S facilitygf ) (S
var
pq ) (Sfixedpq )
Grid-interactive (Sgi) Grid-noninteractive
Fig. 3: Basic taxonomy of DERs [11].
Attribute Grid-noninteractive (Sfixedpq ) Grid-interactive
(Sgi “ Sgf ŤSvarpq )
Power
output fixed
variable/responsive
to grid conditions
Controllable
by response (a)
yes
(remote set-point control)
no (can act as zero output
source while being connected)
Controllable
by response (b)
yes (due to operating
bound violations) no (LVRT & LFRT available)
Controllable by
response (c) yes N/A
Controllable by
response (d) yes yes
(a) Grid-interactive vs. grid-noninteractive DERs.
Attribute PQI-controlled DERs with
variable setpoints (Svarpq )
Grid-forming (Sgf)
Grid-
forming no
yes (under specific
islanding conditions)
Output
control Remote setpoint control Droop-based control
(b) PQI-controlled vs. grid-forming DERs.
Attribute Utility-owned (Sutilitygf ) Facility level (S facilitygf )
Ownership Utility Facility
Islanding
condition
microgrid not connected to
TN but can stay connected to
other microgrid(s) (explained
later in (7))
microgrid operates as
an isolated island (explained
later in (8))
(c) Utility (operator) owned grid-forming DERs vs. facility level grid-
forming DERs.
TABLE II: Comparison of DER categories.
DER classification: Our classification is based on the
output behaviour and service capabilities of DERs. First,
we distinguish between grid-forming DERs (which provide
voltage and frequency references) and DERs whose active
(P) and reactive (Q) power output is controlled by PQ
inverters. We denote the sets of grid-forming and PQ
Inverter (PQI-) controlled DERs by Sgf and Spq, respec-
tively. Then, there are a further two sub-categories of
PQI-controlled DERs: those whose PQ setpoints can be
remotely controlled (denoted by Svarpq ), and others whose
PQ setpoints are fixed (denoted by Sfixedpq ). Since the
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output of the DERs belonging to the set Sfixedpq does not
vary with the grid conditions, they can be considered
as grid-noninteractive DERs. On the other hand, since
the output of the DERs in the sets Sgf and Svarpq can
change with grid-conditions, we consider them as grid-
interactive DERs (denoted by Sgi); see Table IIa. In order
to distinguish the DERs in set Sfixedpq , we refer to them as
distributed generators (DGs). Since the output of these
DGs cannot be changed, if operating bound violations
occur, then they need to be disconnected either by remote
means or through autonomous disconnections.
In contrast, the grid-interactive DERs can stay con-
nected to the DN as zero output sources even under
fluctuations in the network state. Particularly, we assume
that these DERs are fitted with low-voltage and low-
frequency ride through (LVRT and LFRT) functionalities.
This allows DERs to stay connected to the DN during
temporary voltage and frequency bound violations at
nodes. Furthermore, the output of grid-interactive DERs
can be changed by two control mechanisms. In the case of
grid-forming DERs (Sgf), droop-based primary control is
activated under specific islanding conditions. In the case of
DERs in the set Svarpq , their active-reactive (PQ) setpoints
can be controlled by the SA system; see Table IIb.
Let NI Ď N denote a microgrid island within the DN.
Also, let JpSq be the set of DN nodes where DERs in
the set S Ď S are located, with jpsq “ i indicating that
DER s is connected to node i. Recall from Sec. II that a
microgrid island can consist of one or more microgrids.
Based on the number of DERs contributing to grid-
forming services, a microgrid island can be in the following
operating modes [5]:
1) Single-Master Operation (SMO): One DER operates
as a single grid-forming DER (i.e. |JpSgfqŞNI | “ 1),
while all other DERs operate in the PQ mode.
2) Multi-Master Operation (MMO): More than one DER
(but not necessarily all) operate as grid-forming DERs
(i.e. |JpSgfqŞNI | ě 2).
In multi-master operation, the output of multiple grid-
forming DERs changes based on nodal voltage and fre-
quency values under the droop control constraints. These
constraints ensure appropriate power sharing among
DERs based on their capacities. The nodal frequencies
(resp. voltages) are used for active (resp. reactive) power
sharing. Our network model for radial DNs is sufficiently
flexible to allow DN operations in both SMO and MMO
modes.
Finally, there are two sub-categories of grid-forming
DERs, namely utility (or operator) owned grid-forming
DERs and grid-forming DERs belonging to some facilities
such as hospitals or other high priority loads. Each of these
categories contributes to grid-forming services depending
on the specific islanding conditions; see Table IIc. Let
krηs “ 1 if the islanding condition for DER s P Sgf is
satisfied, and krηs “ 0 otherwise. The two main islanding
conditions of interest are as follows:
1) A utility grid-forming DER contributes to grid-
forming services when the node to which it belongs be-
comes a part of a microgrid island (i.e. the node is not
connected to the TN). Consider a DER s P Sutilitygf
and a microgrid Nk such that jpsq “ i P Nk. Then,
DER s contributes to grid-forming if and only if Nk is
not connected to the TN, or equivalently, at least one
connecting line along the path connecting node i to the
substation is open, i.e.
krηs “ 1 ðñ D pm,nq PM
č
Pi such that klηmn “ 1.
We formulate this condition using the following mixed-
integer linear constraints:
krηs ě klηmn @ pm,nq PM
č
Pi (7a)
krηs ď
ř
pm,nqPpMŞPiq klηmn. (7b)
2) The facility level DERs (denoted by S facilitygf ) also
contribute to grid-forming services when the microgrid to
which they belong operates as an isolated island (i.e. not
connected to the TN nor to any other microgrid). Consider
a DER s P S facilitygf and a microgrid Ni such that jpsq P Ni.
Then, DER s contributes to grid-forming if and only if all
the connecting lines connecting the microgrid Ni to the
TN and other microgrids are open, i.e.
krηs “ 1 ðñ klηmn “ 1 @ pm,nq PMi.
We formulate this condition using the following mixed-
integer linear constraints:
krηs ě
`ř
pm,nqPMi kl
η
mn
˘´ p|Mi|´ 1q (8a)
krηs ď klηmn @ pm,nq PMi. (8b)
DER output model: Next, we describe the output
model for the DERs. Each grid-forming DER s P Sgf
consists of a microsource and a storage device (batteries
or flywheels) [5]. The microsource supplies active power
(quadrants I or II) in all three regimes. Thus, the output
of the microsource is constrained as follows:
Gnsrpnηs qnηs sJ ď hns @ s P Sgf, (9)
where Gns P R6ˆ2 is a matrix and hns P R6 is a vector
that represents the polytope as shown in Fig. 4a.
For the sake of modeling simplicity, we assume that the
storage device supplies active power only in the islanded
regimes, whereas it consumes active power in the grid-
connected regime (quadrants III and IV); see Fig. 4.
One justification for this restriction is that the life of a
storage device significantly degrades with frequent charg-
ing/discharging cycles [5]. Indeed, advances in storage
technology make them viable sources of power supply
even in the grid-connected regime. Still our modeling
assumption is relevant to situations where fixed storage
capacity is set aside as contingency reserve to be used in
islanded regimes. Thus, the output of a storage device is
constrained as follows:
Gesrpeηs qeηs sJ `Hskrηs ď hes @ s P Sgf, (10)
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where the Ges, Hs P R8ˆ2 are matrices and hes P R8 is a
vector such that the DER operates in quadrants III and
IV when krηs “ 0; and in quadrants I and II when krηs “ 1;
see Fig. 4b.
The total output of the DER is given by:
prηs “ pnηs ` peηs @ s P Sgf
qrηs “ qnηs ` qeηs @ s P Sgf.
(11)
On the other hand, PQI-controlled DERs (Spq) consist
only of a microsource, and do not have a storage device.
Thus, their output is constrained as in Fig. 4a. We can
simply assume that @ s P Spq, peηs “ qeηs “ 0.
Active
power
Reactive power
qn
qn
pn
I
II
(a) Microsource model
Active
power
Reactive power
I
IIIII
IV
pe
qe
qe
pe
(b) Storage device model
Fig. 4: DER output model [12].
Droop control equations: We model the regulation
services provided by one or more grid-forming DERs using
voltage and frequency droop control equations [10]. This
allows the DERs to adjust their active and reactive power
outputs based on local voltage and frequency measure-
ments, thus eliminating the need for explicit coordination
among DERs (for the purpose of regulation).
The output changes of a grid-forming DER s P Sgf
depend on whether or not it is contributing to regulation
(i.e. krηs = 1 or 0) based on the islanding conditions (see (7)
and (8)). Then, the classical voltage droop equation [10]
can be refined to model the reactive power output of a
grid-forming DER as follows (see Fig. 5a):∣∣vηi ´ `vrefs ´mqspqrηs ´ qrrefs q˘∣∣ ď p1´ krηsqM
@ s P Sgf, i P N and i “ jpsq. (12)
Eq. (12) implies that when a DER provides regulation, it
contributes more (resp. less) reactive power as the voltage
drops (resp. rises) relative to a reference value.
Similarly, the classical frequency droop control equa-
tion [10] can be refined to model the active power output
of a grid-forming DER as follows (see Fig. 5b):∣∣fηi ´ `f refs ´mps `prηs ´ prrefs ˘˘∣∣ ď p1´ krηsqM
@ s P Sgf, i P N and i “ jpsq. (13)
Eq. (13) ensures proper power sharing in the sense that
DERs can adjust their active power contributions for
frequency regulation depending on their individual capaci-
ties. The reference setpoints (f refs ,vrefs ,prrefs ,qrrefs ) and the
droop coefficients (mps,mqs) are given constants.1
qn
s
` qe
s qns ` qes
vi
vrefs
vi
(a) Voltage droop control.
pn
s
` pe
s pns ` pes
f i
f refs
f i
(b) Frequency droop control.
Fig. 5: Droop control model [10].
As in [1], we assume that each node has a DG (i.e. a
grid-noninteractive DER) without loss of generality. Then,
similar to the loads, we model the dependence of DG
connectivity on the nodal voltage and frequency as follows:
kgηi ě vgi ´ vηi , kgηi ě vηi ´ vgi @ i P N, (14)
kgηi ě fgi ´ fηi , kgηi ě fηi ´ fgi @ i P N. (15)
Eqs. (14)-(15) imply that a DG will disconnect if the
corresponding nodal voltage or frequency violates safe
operating bounds.
The net power consumed at a node i is the power
consumed by the load minus the power generated by the
DGs and other grid-interactive DERs at that node, i.e.
pηi “ pcηi ´ pgηi ´
ř
sPSgi|jpsq“i pr
η
s @ i P N (16a)
qηi “ qcηi ´ qgηi ´
ř
sPSgi|jpsq“i qr
η
s @ i P N. (16b)
Finally, we summarize the LinDistFlow and connectivity
constraints described in [1] as follows:
P ηij “
ÿ
k:pj,kqPE
P ηjk ` pηj @ pi, jq P E (17)
Qηij “
ÿ
k:pj,kqPE
Qηjk ` qηj @ pi, jq P E (18)
pgηi “ p1´ kgηi qpgi @ i P N (19)
qgηi “ p1´ kgηi qqgi @ i P N (20)
pcηi “ βηi pci, qcηi “ βηi qci @ i P N (21)
p1´ kcηi qβi ď βηi ď p1´ kcηi q @ i P N (22)
kcηi ě vci ´ vηi , kcηi ě vηi ´ vci@ i P N. (23)
This completes the discussion of our multi-regime micro-
grid network model with parallel operation of DERs.
IV. Bilevel Optimization Problem
In [1], we modeled the sequential interaction between
the attacker and operator as a bilevel mixed-integer prob-
lem (BiMIP). We now extend this model to include mi-
crogrid operations and DER dispatch capabilities. Our re-
vised BiMIP formulation considers multi-regime microgrid
1The secondary control of voltage and frequency regulation could
change the reference setpoints of the DERs, namely the voltage,
frequency, active and reactive power setpoints [13]. Secondary control
may also include changing the droop coefficients of the DERs [14].
However, for the sake of simplicity, we consider primary (but not
secondary) control in this paper.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONTROL NETWORK SYSTEMS 7
operations with multiple DERs/DGs. It also accounts for
TN-side voltage and frequency disturbances as part of the
overall disturbance model.
TN-side disruption: We consider TN-side disturbance
in our attack model because the DN can face significant
loss if the attacker targets the DN during an active TN
failure event. In general, a TN-side disturbance (e.g. failure
of a transmission line or bulk generator) can impact the
system frequency as well as the substation voltage of the
DN, and this can influence the attacker’s strategy. We
model the impact of a TN-side failure as a perturbation
in the substation voltage and frequency, denoted ∆v0 and
∆f0, respectively. Then, the voltage and frequency at
the substation node in the post-contingency stage can be
written:
vc0 “ vnom ´∆v0, (24)
f c0 “ fnom ´∆f0. (25)
DN-side disruption: For the sake of consistency, we
consider the same model of DN-side disruption as in [1], i.e.
an attacker-induced compromise of the DG management
system (DGMS) results in simultaneous disruption of
multiple DGs. We model this attack as follows:
kgci ě di @ i P N. (26)
Let k denote the maximum number of DGs that the
attacker can disrupt. Then, the set of all possible attacker
strategies, denoted Dmk , is given by
Dmk “ td P t0, 1uN |
ř
iPN di ď ku.
Unlike DGs (set Sfixedpq ), the output of grid-interactive
DERs (set Sgi) changes depending on the grid condi-
tions. In particular, the DER output either changes au-
tonomously based on the droop control equations, or the
DERs are explicitly coordinated by the SA. The DERs
are not vulnerable under our assumed disruption model
because they are not affected by the compromised DGMS.
Note that the above-mentioned disruption model can be
extended to other types of attacks, including disruption of
loads or circuit breakers. One can model such attacks as
follows:
kcci ě dci @ i P N
klcij ě dlij @ pi, jq P E,
where dc P t0, 1uN and dl P t0, 1uE denote the correspond-
ing attacks for loads and DN lines, respectively. Thus,
despite its simplicity, our approach to modeling DN-side
disruptions can be applied to capture the physical impact
of a broad class of security failure scenarios. This class
includes Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks on
the power grid components that can result in simultaneous
failures [15, 16, 17]. Another relevant attack scenario is
motivated by the vulnerabilities of Internet connected
customer-side devices (e.g. smart inverters, air condition-
ers, water heaters), also known as Internet-of-Things (IoT)
devices [15]. An adversary can hack into these components
via a cyberattack, create an IoT botnet, and can access
them via the internet. Indeed, recent work in cyber-
security of power systems has identified risk of correlated
failures (e.g. simultaneous on/off events) induced/caused
by IoT botnets [16]. In our disruption model, the impact
of such an attack can be straightforwardly modeled by
load/DG/line disconnects, leading to a sudden supply-
demand disturbance. However, a single point of failure
such as a cyberattack on the DGMS is perhaps a more
critical threat to DNs with significant penetration of DGs.
Remark 2. Another attack model that is well-studied
in the literature considers false-data injection attacks to
a (small) subset of sensors in order to inject biases in
state estimates, while being undetected by anamoly de-
tectors [18, 19, 20]. Available results include identification
and security of “critical” sensors and attack-resilient state
estimation. However, a less commonly studied aspect is
that of incorrect control actions that could be implemented
as a result of biased state estimation. Based on our pre-
vious work [21], one can argue that our disruption model
can be tailored to capture the changes in supply/demand
of network nodes due to disruption of DGs/loads and/or
component disconnect actions that may be induced by
successful false-data injection attacks on sensor data used
by the control center.
Remark 3. Our disruption model can be extended to
the compromise of grid-interactive DERs as well; see, for
example, [22] in which DERs in Svarpq are compromised by
setpoint manipulation.
Operator response model: Recall the response capa-
bilities (a), (b), (c) and (d) from Sec. I. Since our attack
model is concerned with compromised DGMS, we rule
out response (a) as an operator response. We considered
(b) and (c) in [1]; see Fig. 1. Our underlying assump-
tion is that (c) is not prone to cyberattacks, because
distribution utilities are being regulated under NERC CIP
standards [23], which provide specific guidelines for secure
reperimeterisation of the substation cyber infrastructure.
We consider the response (d) to be executed by the SA,
and thus assume that it is also secure.
The responses (b) and (c) do not consider grid-
interactive DERs nor microgrid islanding capabilities. In
contrast, (d) utilizes both these capabilities, in addition
to load control and preemptive disconnection of compo-
nents. Particularly, we model the operator response (d)
as follows: u :“ pkl, kr, pr, qr, β, kc, kgq. Then, the set
of all response strategies, denoted Um, can be defined as
Um :“ t0, 1uMˆt0, 1uSgfˆpRˆRqSgiˆBˆt0, 1uNˆt0, 1uN .
Moreover, given the attacker-induced disruption d, let the
set Umpdq :“ tu P Um | (26) holdsu denote the set of
feasible response strategies available to the operator after
the disruption.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider that in the pre-
contingency stage, the DN is in the grid-connected regime
and all components are connected. That is, there are
no microgrid islands (klo “ 0), and all the loads and
DGs are connected to the DN (kco “ 0 and kgo “ 0).
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Consequently, the grid-forming DERs are not contributing
to regulation in the pre-contingency stage o, i.e. kros “ 0
for all s P S. We also assume the output of the grid-
interactive DERs in mode o to be zero, i.e. pros “ qros “ 0
for all s P Sgi. These are not restrictive assumptions,
however they allow us to straightforwardly compare the
effectiveness of each of the response (b), (c) and (d).
Post-contingency costs: The post-contingency loss in-
curred by the operator, denoted Lm, is the sum of the
following costs: (i) cost due to loss of voltage and frequency
regulation, (ii) cost of load control, (iii) cost of load
shedding, and (iv) cost of islanding:
Lm “WVR ‖vnom ´ v‖8 `WFR ‖fnom ´ f‖8
`WLC řiPN p1´ βiqpci
` pWLS ´WLCqřiPN kcipci
`WMG řpi,jqPM klij ,
(27)
where WLC P R` denotes the cost of per unit load control,
WLS P R` and WLS ě WLC is the cost of per unit load
shed, WMG is the cost of a single islanding control action,
WVR P R` is the cost of the largest deviation of nodal
voltage from the nominal value vnom “ 1 pu, and WFR is
the cost of the largest deviation of nodal frequency from
the nominal value fnom “ 1 pu.
For a given operator response u P Um, let Xmpuq
denote the set of post-contingency states x that satisfy
the constraints (1)-(25). Then, we can restate our bilevel
formulation (P2) as:
LMG :“ max
dPDmk
min
uPUmpdq
Lmpu, xcq
s.t. xc P Xmpuq.
(P-MG)
Since (P-MG) is a BiMIP with the same mathematical
structure as the BiMIP in [1], we solve it using the Benders
Decomposition algorithm that we developed in [1].
V. Computational study
Now, we present computational results to: (i) compare
the output value of our BD algorithm with the optimal
value (generated for small networks by simple enumer-
ation); (ii) compare the DN resilience under response
capabilities (b), (c) and (d); and (iii) show the scalability
of our approach to realistically large DN network sizes
N P t24, 36, 118u.
Setup for computational study: We consider three
networks: modified IEEE 24-, 36-, and 118-node networks;
see Fig. 10 in the Appendix. The set of connecting lines
M are shown with thick edges. The individual micro-
grid networks N1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,N|M| can be obtained by setting
klij “ 1 @ pi, jq PM. Each line pi, jq P E has an identical
impedance of rij “ 0.01,xij “ 0.02. Half of the nodes have
a DG each and half have a load each. Consider a parameter
α “ 6N . Before the contingency, each DG has active power
output of pgi “ α, and each load has a demand of
pci “ 1.25α. The voltage bounds are vci “ 0.9, vci “ 1.1,
vg
i
“ 0.92 and vgi “ 1.08. The reactive power values are
chosen to be exactly one third that of the corresponding
active power value, i.e. a 0.95 lagging power factor for each
load and DG. The values are chosen such that the total net
active power demand in the DN is 0.75 pu, and the lowest
voltage in the network before any contingency is close to
vg. The maximum load control parameter is β
i
“ 0.8,
i.e. at most 20% of each load demand can be curtailed.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all DGs and
loads are homogeneous. The values of cost coefficients
are chosen to be WLC “ 100{pci,WVR “ 100,WFR “
100,WLS “ 1000{pci,WMG “ 400. Each microgrid has one
utility grid-forming (GF) DER and one facility-GF DER.
Consider a parameter γ “ přiPN pciq{p8 |M|q. Then,
each facility level DER has the following parameters:
@ s P S facilitygf ,pns “ pes “ qns “ qes “ γ, mps “ 0.02,
mqs “ 0.04; and, each utility-owned DER has the follow-
ing parameters: @ s P Sutilitygf , pns “ pes “ qns “ qes “
2γ, mps “ 0.1, mqs “ 0.2. These parameters are chosen
such that the total capacity of grid-noninteractive DGs
is 80% of the total demand, whereas the total capacity of
all grid-interactive DERs is 75% of the total demand of all
loads. However, the total capacity of grid-interactive DERs
may not be fully available to meet the demand because
the microgrids are typically not of exact uniform size and
topology, and the storage devices supply power only under
the specific islanding configurations.
Benders Decomposition vs. Simple Enumeration: We
evaluate the ability of our implementation of the BD
algorithm to compute optimal attacks in the islanding
regime for small (N P t24, 36u) networks. For each possible
cardinality of attack we first compute the optimal attack
with maximum loss using simple enumeration. Then we fix
the maximum loss as Ltarget for the BD algorithm. If the
BD algorithm can find an attack with the same cardinality,
then indeed the BD algorithm has computed the optimal
attack. Otherwise, it has computed a suboptimal attack.
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Fig. 6: System resilience (R “ 100 p1´ L{Lmaxq) vs. k.
Near-optimal performance of BD algorithm.
The results of the BD algorithm implemented for solving
(P-MG) are shown in Fig. 6. Naturally, the attack cardi-
nality computed by BD algorithm is greater than or equal
to the optimal min-cardinality computed using simple
enumeration. In some cases, however, the BD algorithm
does not obtain the optimal attack. The BD algorithm
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involves iteratively eliminating sub-optimal attacks using
Benders cuts [1]. Each cut involved an  which results in
a tradeoff between the accuracy and computational time.
For a very small choice of , the BD algorithm eliminates
exactly one sub-optimal attack in each iteration, and
performs as worse as simple enumeration. For a large value
of , relatively more attacks, including optimal attacks
are eliminated. Hence, the BD algorithm terminates faster
although with some loss of optimality. Still, for both 24-
and 36-node networks, the BD algorithm computes attacks
whose cardinalities are at most 8-23% more than the
cardinalities of the corresponding optimal attacks.
Value of timely response: In [1], we used post-
contingency loss to define the metric of resilience for
autonomous disconnections (RAD) and operator response
without microgrid capabilities (RMm). In Sec. I, we in-
troduced an analogously defined metric of resilience for
operator response involving microgrid islanding and DER
dispatch capabilities (RMG). Fig. 7 compares the resiliency
values for the three cases for varying attack cardinalities,
where computation of RMG and RMm involves using the
BD algorithm to solve the corresponding BiMIPs, and
RAD is computed using Algorithm “Uncontrolled cascade
under autonomous disconnections (response (b))” in [1].
Indeed, under response (d), the SA triggers microgrid
islanding and DER dispatch in a preemptive manner to
reduce the impact of the attack. This leads to a smaller
loss in comparison to using just load control and/or
component disconnects (that is, response (c)). Indeed, our
computational results validate that RMG ě RMm ě RAD.
The difference between the dashed (green) and solid (red)
curves in Fig. 7 indicate the value of response (d) relative
to response (b). The difference between the dashed (green)
and cross-marked (blue) curves indicate the relative value
of timely response (d) over response (c).
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Fig. 7: DN resilience under varying attacker-operator in-
teraction scenarios. (The blue double-sided arrows indicate
the value of timely microgrid response relative to the
autonomous disconnections case.)
Scalability of the BD algorithm: We tabulate the
performance of the BD algorithm in terms of its
computational time and number of iterations to com-
pute min-cardinality attacks for different network sizes
and varying values of the resilience metric Rtarget “
100 p1´ Ltarget{Lmaxq; see Table III. We also note the
cardinalities of attacks output by the BD algorithm as well
as the corresponding DN resilience. Note that the N “ 118
node network has 2118 possible configuration vectors. Still,
with Rtarget “ 80%, the BD algorithm computes an attack
in « 1 minute. In comparison, for the N “ 36 node
network, the simple enumeration method took « 6 hours.
Entries are resilience metric of DN (in percentage), number
of iterations (written in brackets), time (in seconds), attack
cardinality.
Rtarget N “ 24 N “ 36 N “ 118
99 98.91, (15), 0.41, 6 98.95, (10), 0.37, 5 98.95, (8), 2.48, 4
95 91.33, (16), 0.46, 7 94.12, (12), 0.51, 7 94.28, (15), 3.91, 11
90 82.8, (18), 0.57, 9 88.23, (17), 0.91, 11 89.73, (20), 10.62, 16
85 82.8, (18), 0.57, 9 81.9, (20), 1.23, 14 83.49, (29), 28.79, 25
80 78.73, (21), 0.74, 12 71.46, (21), 1.75, 15 79.9, (40), 67.38, 36
TABLE III: Resiliency metric evaluated using the BD
algorithm for 24-, 36- and 118-node networks. The realized
resilience metric can significantly fall short of the target
resilience metric (Rtarget “ 100 p1´ Ltarget{Lmaxq); for
example, when the attack cardinality changes from 6 to 7,
the percentage resilience for the 24-node network decreases
sharply from 98.91% to 91.33%. This means that the 24-
node DN is at least 90% (actual value 91.33%) resilient to
k “ 7 cardinality attacks.
VI. Multi-period DN restoration
We recall that the resilience of a system is related to its
ability to not only minimize the impact of a disturbance,
but also quickly recover from it; see Fig. 1. Our attack
model assumes that a compromise of the DGMS leads to
remote disconnection of multiple DGs. However, the actual
functionality of disconnected DGs is not compromised.
In response (d), we consider that the SA has the ability
to detect and obtain knowledge of the complete attack.
Moreover, the SA can also control DG connectivity. We
now discuss how the SA can restore the disrupted DGs,
and bring the DN back to its nominal performance. In this
section, we present a simple MIP that models the process
of restoring system performance.
Our model of the DN restoration process entails pro-
gressively reconnecting the disrupted DGs, and eventually
restoration to the grid-connected mode of DN operation.
We consider a multi-period horizon T “ t0, 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,Tu
where the end of the 0th period coincides with the time
when the restoration actions begin; see Fig. 1. Let a period
be denoted by t P T , where each period t is of fixed time
duration (say, a few minutes). Furthermore, the operator
response at period t is denoted by ut. Let T “ tres ` 1,
where tres P Z` denotes the earliest time period when all
disrupted DGs can be restored.
A TN-disturbance may clear any time, before or after
the DG reconnections. However, since our analysis is
focused on determining worst-case resilience of the DN,
we assume that the TN-side disturbance clears after the
disrupted DGs are fully reconnected, i.e. beyond time T.
Under the assumed detection and response capabilities of
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the SA, the restoration action begins only after t “ 0.
Thus, the operator control actions in the 0th time period
are the same as the initial contingency response, i.e.
u0 “ uc. Similarly, the operator control actions remain
unchanged after the restoration actions are complete un-
til just prior to the TN-disturbance clearing. Therefore,
without loss of generality we can assume that t2 “ T, and
restrict our analysis to the horizon T .
We consider two types of constraints to model the
restoration actions of the operator across time periods:
monotonicity constraints and resource constraints. Con-
sider a period t P t1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,Tu. The monotonicity con-
straints for period t are:
kltij ď klt´1ij @ pi, jq PM, (28a)
kgti ď kgt´1i @ i P N. (28b)
Eq. (28a) implies that during the restoration process,
once a connecting line is closed, it remains closed until
the restoration process is completed. Similarly, (28b) im-
plies that a disconnected DG becomes operational after
being reconnected, and then remains operational until
the restoration is complete. The monotonicity constraints
can be justified based on the practical consideration that
frequently changing the status of connecting lines can
create large fluctuations in nodal voltages and frequencies
of the microgrids due to the low inertia of DERs. Moreover,
the battery life of storage devices would reduce due to
frequent changes from charging modes (quadrants III and
IV) to discharging modes (quadrants I and II), and vice
versa; see Fig. 4.
The resource constraint merely limits the number of DG
reconnections. Specifically, we consider that during period
t, at most Gt DGs can be reconnected, where Gt denotes
the restoration budget for that period:ř
iPSfixedpq kg
t
i ě
ř
iPSfixedpq kg
t´1
i ´Gt. (29)
Restrictions on the number of connecting line closing
operations can be similarly considered. Eq. (29) can also
be justified in a way similar to that of the monotonicity
constraints. Naturally, the operator wants to avoid a large
number of simultaneous DG reconnections as that could
lead to large voltage and frequency fluctuations.
We must choose T large enough so that all disrupted
DGs can be reconnected over the horizon T . This implies
T “ mintt1|řt1t“1 Gt ě ku ` 1. Also, we assumed that the
TN-side disturbance ceases to exist at the last time period.
We model this as:
vt0 “
#
vnom ´∆v0 if t ‰ T
vnom if t “ T (30a)
f t0 “
#
fnom ´∆f0 if t ‰ T
fnom if t “ T. (30b)
Let Ytmput´1q denote the feasible set of response strate-
gies for ut, i.e. Ytmput´1q “ tut P Um | such that (28) ´
(29) holdu. Also, given an operator response u P Um, let
X tmpuq denote the set of network states xt which satisfy
the constraints (1)-(14) and (30). Hence, the restoration
problem can be posed as:
Lrespdq :“ mintututPT
ÿ
tPT
Lm
`
ut, xt
˘
s.t. u0 P Umpdq
ut P Ytmput´1q @ t “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,T
xt P X tmputq @ t “ 0, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,T.
(P3)
Problem (P3) is a Mixed-Integer Problem (MIP), and can
be solved using off-the-shelf MIP solvers. However, due
to the large number of binary variables, it can become
computational expensive to solve for larger networks. In
fact, we solve (P3) using a simple greedy algorithm; see Al-
gorithm 1. In each period, the operator simply chooses
that response which minimizes the post-contingency loss
during that time period subject to the monotonicity and
resource constraints. Algorithm 1 is based on the feature
that the network state in any period depends only on the
operator actions in that period, and the network state in
the previous period. The algorithm returns with the op-
erator actions, resulting network state, and corresponding
post-contingency loss for each time period.
Algorithm 1 Greedy Algorithm
1: u0, x0 Ð argmin
uPUmpdq
Lmpu, xq s.t. x P X puq.
2: for t “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,T do
3: ut, xt Ð argmin
uPYtmput´1q
Lmpu, xq s.t. x P X tmpuq.
4: Lt Ð Lmput, xtq
5: end for
6: return tut, xt, LtutPT
Fig. 8 shows the system performance during the restora-
tion of the DN over multiple time periods for different
resource constraints. For each system restoration curve, we
chose Gt to be a constant for all time periods t P T . One
can see that after the TN-side and DN-side disturbances,
the system performance drops. Then, as disrupted compo-
nents are connected, the system performance progressively
recovers. Also, the post-contingency losses are higher for
larger TN-side disturbances. However, as the restoration
budget increases, the system recovers faster.
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Fig. 8: Multi-period DN restoration (N “ 36).
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MIP vs. Greedy Recovery Algorithm: Fig. 9 shows the
comparison of the system performance recovery curves
obtained using Algorithm 1 and by directly solving the
large-scale MIP for N “ 24 and N “ 36 node networks.
The TN-side voltage disturbance for both the networks
is set to ∆v0 “ 0.2. In this experiment, we set the
time limit of the (Gurobi) solver to 7200 seconds. While
solving the large-scale MIP for N “ 36 and G “ 3 we
were able to achieve an optimality gap of 16.54% after 2
hours. However, Algorithm 1 was able to attain the same
system performance recovery curve using the default solver
settings (no presolve and Simplex method), and compute
the near-optimal solution in approximately 10 seconds.
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Fig. 9: Near-optimal performance of Greedy Algorithm 1.
In order to implement the response computed in (P3),
the SA may need to coordinate with the individual micro-
grid controllers. A detailed description of such a commu-
nication architecture is beyond the scope of this paper.
We refer the reader to [24] for a hierarchical control
architecture which can support the coordination between
SA and individual microgrid controllers.
VII. Concluding remarks
In this paper and its companion paper [1], we developed
a quantitative framework to evaluate DN resilience, which
is its ability to minimize the impact of a disturbance, and
to restore the DN back to full load supply. It has been
shown that the impact of a broad class of cyberphysical
failure scenarios can be modeled as DN-side disruption of
multiple components and/or disturbances in substation
voltage and frequency. We developed a novel network
model which captures operation of microgrid(s) under var-
ious regimes, and single-/multi-master operation of DERs.
Various operator response strategies were considered: from
load control and component disconnects to microgrid is-
landing and DER dispatch. Furthermore, we formulated
the attacker-operator interactions as bilevel mixed-integer
problems, and developed a computational approach to
efficiently solve these problems using a Benders decom-
position algorithm. Restoration of DN performance over
multiple time periods was considered, and a greedy algo-
rithm was presented for solving this problem. Our compu-
tational results show the value of timely response under
varying operator capabilities in minimizing the impact of
disruption.
Even though a linear power flow was used and only basic
aspects of microgrid operations have been considered, the
paper provides a rich and flexible modeling framework
for analyzing DN resilience for more sophisticated attack
and response capabilities. Other cyber-physical security
scenarios can be similarly analyzed by considering a clear
demarcation between the vulnerable and the securely con-
trollable DN components. The computational approach
for solving the bilevel formulation arising from the linear
power flow approximation can, in principle, be extended
to convex (second-order cone) relaxations of the nonlin-
ear power flow model. This approach may be useful for
optimal resource allocation [12] and security investments
for DNs [22]. The framework also provides the basis for re-
siliency assessment of other smart infrastructure networks.
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Fig. 10: Modified IEEE test networks. Connecting lines
are indicated by thick edges. Utility-owned (resp. facility
level) grid-forming DERs are indicated by northwest (resp.
vertical) lines.
